Nothing changes really, but this article shows how all US citizens are being played by their own beloved government. The ambiguous government double-speak, passing off the Convenient Reason rather than the Inconvenient Truth, the manipulation of the citizen’s trust through such an accommodating media — it has all been too easy. And because the US citizen’s need assurance, because they suffer, they therefore fully trust their national government’s decisions since few Americans seem to understand economics. And, anyway, Americans surely have no reasons to question their own government’s economic motives or decisions. It would be madness indeed for anyone to believe that the US government might actually be hiding the true facts of the financial crisis from its own people for its own separate reasons. The extent of ths quiet deception has not been fully appreciated. But the fact is that the US government has not been straight with its citizens and is steadily leading them towards economic disaster, like lemmings on a picnic.

One important question has never been fully answered or addressed by either the Bush or the Obama Administrations:

Why has there been no full investigation as to the causes and reasons for the current financial crisis? And so how can the Obama Administration fully regulate and prevent a crisis like this again unless there is an investigation?

Here is the transcript of an interview of William Black, concerning this and other  issues. Mr Black is quite a guy and is a widely respected economist and is a professor of Economics and Law at Missouri University.

What follows is the transcript of a revealing interview by William Black. If you want to view the video of this interview instead, then click here.

From Bill Moyer’s Journal

BILL MOYERS: Welcome to the Journal.

For months now, revelations of the wholesale greed and blatant transgressions of Wall Street have reminded us that “The Best Way to Rob a Bank Is to Own One.” In fact, the man you’re about to meet wrote a book with just that title. It was based upon his experience as a tough regulator during one of the darkest chapters in our financial history: the savings and loan scandal in the late 1980s.

WILLIAM K. BLACK: These numbers as large as they are, vastly understate the problem of fraud.

BILL MOYERS: Bill Black was in New York this week for a conference at the John Jay College of Criminal Justice where scholars and journalists gathered to ask the question, “How do they get away with it?” Well, no one has asked that question more often than Bill Black.

The former Director of the Institute for Fraud Prevention now teaches Economics and Law at the University of Missouri, Kansas City. During the savings and loan crisis, it was Black who accused then-house speaker Jim Wright and five US Senators, including John Glenn and John McCain, of doing favors for the S&L’s in exchange for contributions and other perks. The senators got off with a slap on the wrist, but so enraged was one of those bankers, Charles Keating — after whom the senate’s so-called “Keating Five” were named — he sent a memo that read, in part, “get Black — kill him dead.” Metaphorically, of course. Of course.

Now Black is focused on an even greater scandal, and he spares no one — not even the President he worked hard to elect, Barack Obama. But his main targets are the Wall Street barons, heirs of an earlier generation whose scandalous rip-offs of wealth back in the 1930s earned them comparison to Al Capone and the mob, and the nickname “banksters.”

BILL MOYERS: Bill Black, welcome to the Journal.

WILLIAM K. BLACK: Thank you.

BILL MOYERS: I was taken with your candor at the conference here in New York to hear you say that this crisis we’re going through, this economic and financial meltdown is driven by fraud. What’s your definition of fraud?

WILLIAM K. BLACK: Fraud is deceit. And the essence of fraud is, “I create trust in you, and then I betray that trust, and get you to give me something of value.” And as a result, there’s no more effective acid against trust than fraud, especially fraud by top elites, and that’s what we have.

BILL MOYERS: In your book, you make it clear that calculated dishonesty by people in charge is at the heart of most large corporate failures and scandals, including, of course, the S&L, but is that true? Is that what you’re saying here, that it was in the boardrooms and the CEO offices where this fraud began?

WILLIAM K. BLACK: Absolutely.

BILL MOYERS: How did they do it? What do you mean?

WILLIAM K. BLACK: Well, the way that you do it is to make really bad loans, because they pay better. Then you grow extremely rapidly, in other words, you’re a Ponzi-like scheme. And the third thing you do is we call it leverage. That just means borrowing a lot of money, and the combination creates a situation where you have guaranteed record profits in the early years. That makes you rich, through the bonuses that modern executive compensation has produced. It also makes it inevitable that there’s going to be a disaster down the road.

BILL MOYERS: So you’re suggesting, saying that CEOs of some of these banks and mortgage firms in order to increase their own personal income, deliberately set out to make bad loans?

WILLIAM K. BLACK: Yes.

BILL MOYERS: How do they get away with it? I mean, what about their own checks and balances in the company? What about their accounting divisions?

WILLIAM K. BLACK: All of those checks and balances report to the CEO, so if the CEO goes bad, all of the checks and balances are easily overcome. And the art form is not simply to defeat those internal controls, but to suborn them, to turn them into your greatest allies. And the bonus programs are exactly how you do that.

BILL MOYERS: If I wanted to go looking for the parties to this, with a good bird dog, where would you send me?

WILLIAM K. BLACK: Well, that’s exactly what hasn’t happened. We haven’t looked, all right? The Bush Administration essentially got rid of regulation, so if nobody was looking, you were able to do this with impunity and that’s exactly what happened. Where would you look? You’d look at the specialty lenders. The lenders that did almost all of their work in the sub-prime and what’s called Alt-A, liars’ loans.

BILL MOYERS: Yeah. Liars’ loans–

WILLIAM K. BLACK: Liars’ loans.

BILL MOYERS: Why did they call them liars’ loans?

WILLIAM K. BLACK: Because they were liars’ loans.

BILL MOYERS: And they knew it?

WILLIAM K. BLACK: They knew it. They knew that they were frauds.

WILLIAM K. BLACK: Liars’ loans mean that we don’t check. You tell us what your income is. You tell us what your job is. You tell us what your assets are, and we agree to believe you. We won’t check on any of those things. And by the way, you get a better deal if you inflate your income and your job history and your assets.

BILL MOYERS: You think they really said that to borrowers?

WILLIAM K. BLACK: We know that they said that to borrowers. In fact, they were also called, in the trade, ninja loans.

BILL MOYERS: Ninja?

WILLIAM K. BLACK: Yeah, because no income verification, no job verification, no asset verification.

BILL MOYERS: You’re talking about significant American companies.

WILLIAM K. BLACK: Huge! One company produced as many losses as the entire Savings and Loan debacle.

BILL MOYERS: Which company?

WILLIAM K. BLACK: IndyMac specialized in making liars’ loans. In 2006 alone, it sold $80 billion dollars of liars’ loans to other companies. $80 billion.

BILL MOYERS: And was this happening exclusively in this sub-prime mortgage business?

WILLIAM K. BLACK: No, and that’s a big part of the story as well. Even prime loans began to have non-verification. Even Ronald Reagan, you know, said, “Trust, but verify.” They just gutted the verification process. We know that will produce enormous fraud, under economic theory, criminology theory, and two thousand years of life experience.

BILL MOYERS: Is it possible that these complex instruments were deliberately created so swindlers could exploit them?

WILLIAM K. BLACK: Oh, absolutely. This stuff, the exotic stuff that you’re talking about was created out of things like liars’ loans, that were known to be extraordinarily bad. And now it was getting triple-A ratings. Now a triple-A rating is supposed to mean there is zero credit risk. So you take something that not only has significant, it has crushing risk. That’s why it’s toxic. And you create this fiction that it has zero risk. That itself, of course, is a fraudulent exercise. And again, there was nobody looking, during the Bush years. So finally, only a year ago, we started to have a Congressional investigation of some of these rating agencies, and it’s scandalous what came out. What we know now is that the rating agencies never looked at a single loan file. When they finally did look, after the markets had completely collapsed, they found, and I’m quoting Fitch, the smallest of the rating agencies, “the results were disconcerting, in that there was the appearance of fraud in nearly every file we examined.”

BILL MOYERS: So if your assumption is correct, your evidence is sound, the bank, the lending company, created a fraud. And the ratings agency that is supposed to test the value of these assets knowingly entered into the fraud. Both parties are committing fraud by intention.

WILLIAM K. BLACK: Right, and the investment banker that — we call it pooling — puts together these bad mortgages, these liars’ loans, and creates the toxic waste of these derivatives. All of them do that. And then they sell it to the world and the world just thinks because it has a triple-A rating it must actually be safe. Well, instead, there are 60 and 80 percent losses on these things, because of course they, in reality, are toxic waste.

BILL MOYERS: You’re describing what Bernie Madoff did to a limited number of people. But you’re saying it’s systemic, a systemic Ponzi scheme.

WILLIAM K. BLACK: Oh, Bernie was a piker. He doesn’t even get into the front ranks of a Ponzi scheme…

BILL MOYERS: But you’re saying our system became a Ponzi scheme.

WILLIAM K. BLACK: Our system…

BILL MOYERS: Our financial system…

WILLIAM K. BLACK: Became a Ponzi scheme. Everybody was buying a pig in the poke. But they were buying a pig in the poke with a pretty pink ribbon, and the pink ribbon said, “Triple-A.”

BILL MOYERS: Is there a law against liars’ loans?

WILLIAM K. BLACK: Not directly, but there, of course, many laws against fraud, and liars’ loans are fraudulent.

BILL MOYERS: Because…

WILLIAM K. BLACK: Because they’re not going to be repaid and because they had false representations. They involve deceit, which is the essence of fraud.

BILL MOYERS: Why is it so hard to prosecute? Why hasn’t anyone been brought to justice over this?

WILLIAM K. BLACK: Because they didn’t even begin to investigate the major lenders until the market had actually collapsed, which is completely contrary to what we did successfully in the Savings and Loan crisis, right? Even while the institutions were reporting they were the most profitable savings and loan in America, we knew they were frauds. And we were moving to close them down. Here, the Justice Department, even though it very appropriately warned, in 2004, that there was an epidemic…

BILL MOYERS: Who did?

WILLIAM K. BLACK: The FBI publicly warned, in September 2004 that there was an epidemic of mortgage fraud, that if it was allowed to continue it would produce a crisis at least as large as the Savings and Loan debacle. And that they were going to make sure that they didn’t let that happen. So what goes wrong? After 9/11, the attacks, the Justice Department transfers 500 white-collar specialists in the FBI to national terrorism. Well, we can all understand that. But then, the Bush administration refused to replace the missing 500 agents. So even today, again, as you say, this crisis is 1000 times worse, perhaps, certainly 100 times worse, than the Savings and Loan crisis. There are one-fifth as many FBI agents as worked the Savings and Loan crisis.

BILL MOYERS: You talk about the Bush administration. Of course, there’s that famous photograph of some of the regulators in 2003, who come to a press conference with a chainsaw suggesting that they’re going to slash, cut business loose from regulation, right?

WILLIAM K. BLACK: Well, they succeeded. And in that picture, by the way, the other — three of the other guys with pruning shears are the…

BILL MOYERS: That’s right.

WILLIAM K. BLACK: They’re the trade representatives. They’re the lobbyists for the bankers. And everybody’s grinning. The government’s working together with the industry to destroy regulation. Well, we now know what happens when you destroy regulation. You get the biggest financial calamity of anybody under the age of 80.

BILL MOYERS: But I can point you to statements by Larry Summers, who was then Bill Clinton’s Secretary of the Treasury, or the other Clinton Secretary of the Treasury, Rubin. I can point you to suspects in both parties, right?

WILLIAM K. BLACK: There were two really big things, under the Clinton administration. One, they got rid of the law that came out of the real-world disasters of the Great Depression. We learned a lot of things in the Great Depression. And one is we had to separate what’s called commercial banking from investment banking. That’s the Glass-Steagall law. But we thought we were much smarter, supposedly. So we got rid of that law, and that was bipartisan. And the other thing is we passed a law, because there was a very good regulator, Brooksley Born, that everybody should know about and probably doesn’t. She tried to do the right thing to regulate one of these exotic derivatives that you’re talking about. We call them C.D.F.S. And Summers, Rubin, and Phil Gramm came together to say not only will we block this particular regulation. We will pass a law that says you can’t regulate. And it’s this type of derivative that is most involved in the AIG scandal. AIG all by itself, cost the same as the entire Savings and Loan debacle.

BILL MOYERS: What did AIG contribute? What did they do wrong?

WILLIAM K. BLACK: They made bad loans. Their type of loan was to sell a guarantee, right? And they charged a lot of fees up front. So, they booked a lot of income. Paid enormous bonuses. The bonuses we’re thinking about now, they’re much smaller than these bonuses that were also the product of accounting fraud. And they got very, very rich. But, of course, then they had guaranteed this toxic waste. These liars’ loans. Well, we’ve just gone through why those toxic waste, those liars’ loans, are going to have enormous losses. And so, you have to pay the guarantee on those enormous losses. And you go bankrupt. Except that you don’t in the modern world, because you’ve come to the United States, and the taxpayers play the fool. Under Secretary Geithner and under Secretary Paulson before him… we took $5 billion dollars, for example, in U.S. taxpayer money. And sent it to a huge Swiss Bank called UBS. At the same time that that bank was defrauding the taxpayers of America. And we were bringing a criminal case against them. We eventually get them to pay a $780 million fine, but wait, we gave them $5 billion. So, the taxpayers of America paid the fine of a Swiss Bank. And why are we bailing out somebody who that is defrauding us?

BILL MOYERS: And why…

WILLIAM K. BLACK: How mad is this?

BILL MOYERS: What is your explanation for why the bankers who created this mess are still calling the shots?

WILLIAM K. BLACK: Well, that, especially after what’s just happened at G.M., that’s… it’s scandalous.

BILL MOYERS: Why are they firing the president of G.M. and not firing the head of all these banks that are involved?

WILLIAM K. BLACK: There are two reasons. One, they’re much closer to the bankers. These are people from the banking industry. And they have a lot more sympathy. In fact, they’re outright hostile to autoworkers, as you can see. They want to bash all of their contracts. But when they get to banking, they say, ‘contracts, sacred.’ But the other element of your question is we don’t want to change the bankers, because if we do, if we put honest people in, who didn’t cause the problem, their first job would be to find the scope of the problem. And that would destroy the cover up.

BILL MOYERS: The cover up?

WILLIAM K. BLACK: Sure. The cover up.

BILL MOYERS: That’s a serious charge.

WILLIAM K. BLACK: Of course.

BILL MOYERS: Who’s covering up?

WILLIAM K. BLACK: Geithner is charging, is covering up. Just like Paulson did before him. Geithner is publicly saying that it’s going to take $2 trillion — a trillion is a thousand billion — $2 trillion taxpayer dollars to deal with this problem. But they’re allowing all the banks to report that they’re not only solvent, but fully capitalized. Both statements can’t be true. It can’t be that they need $2 trillion, because they have masses losses, and that they’re fine.

These are all people who have failed. Paulson failed, Geithner failed. They were all promoted because they failed, not because…

BILL MOYERS: What do you mean?

WILLIAM K. BLACK: Well, Geithner has, was one of our nation’s top regulators, during the entire subprime scandal, that I just described. He took absolutely no effective action. He gave no warning. He did nothing in response to the FBI warning that there was an epidemic of fraud. All this pig in the poke stuff happened under him. So, in his phrase about legacy assets. Well he’s a failed legacy regulator.

BILL MOYERS: But he denies that he was a regulator. Let me show you some of his testimony before Congress. Take a look at this.

TIMOTHY GEITHNER: I’ve never been a regulator, for better or worse. And I think you’re right to say that we have to be very skeptical that regulation can solve all of these problems. We have parts of our system that are overwhelmed by regulation.

Overwhelmed by regulation! It wasn’t the absence of regulation that was the problem, it was despite the presence of regulation you’ve got huge risks that build up.

WILLIAM K. BLACK: Well, he may be right that he never regulated, but his job was to regulate. That was his mission statement.

BILL MOYERS: As?

WILLIAM K. BLACK: As president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, which is responsible for regulating most of the largest bank holding companies in America. And he’s completely wrong that we had too much regulation in some of these areas. I mean, he gives no details, obviously. But that’s just plain wrong.

BILL MOYERS: How is this happening? I mean why is it happening?

WILLIAM K. BLACK: Until you get the facts, it’s harder to blow all this up. And, of course, the entire strategy is to keep people from getting the facts.

BILL MOYERS: What facts?

WILLIAM K. BLACK: The facts about how bad the condition of the banks is. So, as long as I keep the old CEO who caused the problems, is he going to go vigorously around finding the problems? Finding the frauds?

BILL MOYERS: You–

WILLIAM K. BLACK: Taking away people’s bonuses?

BILL MOYERS: To hear you say this is unusual because you supported Barack Obama, during the campaign. But you’re seeming disillusioned now.

WILLIAM K. BLACK: Well, certainly in the financial sphere, I am. I think, first, the policies are substantively bad. Second, I think they completely lack integrity. Third, they violate the rule of law. This is being done just like Secretary Paulson did it. In violation of the law. We adopted a law after the Savings and Loan crisis, called the Prompt Corrective Action Law. And it requires them to close these institutions. And they’re refusing to obey the law.

BILL MOYERS: In other words, they could have closed these banks without nationalizing them?

WILLIAM K. BLACK: Well, you do a receivership. No one — Ronald Reagan did receiverships. Nobody called it nationalization.

BILL MOYERS: And that’s a law?

WILLIAM K. BLACK: That’s the law.

BILL MOYERS: So, Paulson could have done this? Geithner could do this?

WILLIAM K. BLACK: Not could. Was mandated–

BILL MOYERS: By the law.

WILLIAM K. BLACK: By the law.

BILL MOYERS: This law, you’re talking about.

WILLIAM K. BLACK: Yes.

BILL MOYERS: What the reason they give for not doing it?

WILLIAM K. BLACK: They ignore it. And nobody calls them on it.

BILL MOYERS: Well, where’s Congress? Where’s the press? Where–

WILLIAM K. BLACK: Well, where’s the Pecora investigation?

BILL MOYERS: The what?

WILLIAM K. BLACK: The Pecora investigation. The Great Depression, we said, “Hey, we have to learn the facts. What caused this disaster, so that we can take steps, like pass the Glass-Steagall law, that will prevent future disasters?” Where’s our investigation?

What would happen if after a plane crashes, we said, “Oh, we don’t want to look in the past. We want to be forward looking. Many people might have been, you know, we don’t want to pass blame. No. We have a nonpartisan, skilled inquiry. We spend lots of money on, get really bright people. And we find out, to the best of our ability, what caused every single major plane crash in America. And because of that, aviation has an extraordinarily good safety record. We ought to follow the same policies in the financial sphere. We have to find out what caused the disasters, or we will keep reliving them. And here, we’ve got a double tragedy. It isn’t just that we are failing to learn from the mistakes of the past. We’re failing to learn from the successes of the past.

BILL MOYERS: What do you mean?

WILLIAM K. BLACK: In the Savings and Loan debacle, we developed excellent ways for dealing with the frauds, and for dealing with the failed institutions. And for 15 years after the Savings and Loan crisis, didn’t matter which party was in power, the U.S. Treasury Secretary would fly over to Tokyo and tell the Japanese, “You ought to do things the way we did in the Savings and Loan crisis, because it worked really well. Instead you’re covering up the bank losses, because you know, you say you need confidence. And so, we have to lie to the people to create confidence. And it doesn’t work. You will cause your recession to continue and continue.” And the Japanese call it the lost decade. That was the result. So, now we get in trouble, and what do we do? We adopt the Japanese approach of lying about the assets. And you know what? It’s working just as well as it did in Japan.

BILL MOYERS: Yeah. Are you saying that Timothy Geithner, the Secretary of the Treasury, and others in the administration, with the banks, are engaged in a cover up to keep us from knowing what went wrong?

WILLIAM K. BLACK: Absolutely.

BILL MOYERS: You are.

WILLIAM K. BLACK: Absolutely, because they are scared to death. All right? They’re scared to death of a collapse. They’re afraid that if they admit the truth, that many of the large banks are insolvent. They think Americans are a bunch of cowards, and that we’ll run screaming to the exits. And we won’t rely on deposit insurance. And, by the way, you can rely on deposit insurance. And it’s foolishness. All right? Now, it may be worse than that. You can impute more cynical motives. But I think they are sincerely just panicked about, “We just can’t let the big banks fail.” That’s wrong.

BILL MOYERS: But what might happen, at this point, if in fact they keep from us the true health of the banks?

WILLIAM K. BLACK: Well, then the banks will, as they did in Japan, either stay enormously weak, or Treasury will be forced to increasingly absurd giveaways of taxpayer money. We’ve seen how horrific AIG — and remember, they kept secrets from everyone.

BILL MOYERS: A.I.G. did?

WILLIAM K. BLACK: What we’re doing with — no, Treasury and both administrations. The Bush administration and now the Obama administration kept secret from us what was being done with AIG. AIG was being used secretly to bail out favored banks like UBS and like Goldman Sachs. Secretary Paulson’s firm, that he had come from being CEO. It got the largest amount of money. $12.9 billion. And they didn’t want us to know that. And it was only Congressional pressure, and not Congressional pressure, by the way, on Geithner, but Congressional pressure on AIG.

Where Congress said, “We will not give you a single penny more unless we know who received the money.” And, you know, when he was Treasury Secretary, Paulson created a recommendation group to tell Treasury what they ought to do with AIG. And he put Goldman Sachs on it.

BILL MOYERS: Even though Goldman Sachs had a big vested stake.

WILLIAM K. BLACK: Massive stake. And even though he had just been CEO of Goldman Sachs before becoming Treasury Secretary. Now, in most stages in American history, that would be a scandal of such proportions that he wouldn’t be allowed in civilized society.

BILL MOYERS: Yeah, like a conflict of interest, it seems.

WILLIAM K. BLACK: Massive conflict of interests.

BILL MOYERS: So, how did he get away with it?

WILLIAM K. BLACK: I don’t know whether we’ve lost our capability of outrage. Or whether the cover up has been so successful that people just don’t have the facts to react to it.

BILL MOYERS: Who’s going to get the facts?

WILLIAM K. BLACK: We need some chairmen or chairwomen–

BILL MOYERS: In Congress.

WILLIAM K. BLACK: –in Congress, to hold the necessary hearings. And we can blast this out. But if you leave the failed CEOs in place, it isn’t just that they’re terrible business people, though they are. It isn’t just that they lack integrity, though they do. Because they were engaged in these frauds. But they’re not going to disclose the truth about the assets.

BILL MOYERS: And we have to know that, in order to know what?

WILLIAM K. BLACK: To know everything. To know who committed the frauds. Whose bonuses we should recover. How much the assets are worth. How much they should be sold for. Is the bank insolvent, such that we should resolve it in this way? It’s the predicate, right? You need to know the facts to make intelligent decisions. And they’re deliberately leaving in place the people that caused the problem, because they don’t want the facts. And this is not new. The Reagan Administration’s central priority, at all times, during the Savings and Loan crisis, was covering up the losses.

BILL MOYERS: So, you’re saying that people in power, political power, and financial power, act in concert when their own behinds are in the ringer, right?

WILLIAM K. BLACK: That’s right. And it’s particularly a crisis that brings this out, because then the class of the banker says, “You’ve got to keep the information away from the public or everything will collapse. If they understand how bad it is, they’ll run for the exits.”

BILL MOYERS: Yeah, and this week in New York, at this conference, you described this as more than a financial crisis. You called it a moral crisis.

WILLIAM K. BLACK: Yes.

BILL MOYERS: Why?

WILLIAM K. BLACK: Because it is a fundamental lack of integrity. But also because, if you look back at crises, an economist who is also a presidential appointee, as a regulator in the Savings and Loan industry, right here in New York, Larry White, wrote a book about the Savings and Loan crisis. And he said, you know, one of the most interesting questions is why so few people engaged in fraud? Because objectively, you could have gotten away with it. But only about ten percent of the CEOs, engaged in fraud. So, 90 percent of them were restrained by ethics and integrity. So, far more than law or by F.B.I. agents, it’s our integrity that often prevents the greatest abuses. And what we had in this crisis, instead of the Savings and Loan, is the most elite institutions in America engaging or facilitating fraud.

BILL MOYERS: This wound that you say has been inflicted on American life. The loss of worker’s income. And security and pensions and future happened, because of the misconduct of a relatively few, very well-heeled people, in very well-decorated corporate suites, right?

WILLIAM K. BLACK: Right.

BILL MOYERS: It was relatively a handful of people.

WILLIAM K. BLACK: And their ideologies, which swept away regulation. So, in the example, regulation means that cheaters don’t prosper. So, instead of being bad for capitalism, it’s what saves capitalism. “Honest purveyors prosper” is what we want. And you need regulation and law enforcement to be able to do this. The tragedy of this crisis is it didn’t need to happen at all.

BILL MOYERS: When you wake in the middle of the night, thinking about your work, what do you make of that? What do you tell yourself?

WILLIAM K. BLACK: There’s a saying that we took great comfort in. It’s actually by the Dutch, who were fighting this impossible war for independence against what was then the most powerful nation in the world, Spain. And their motto was, “It is not necessary to hope in order to persevere.”

Now, going forward, get rid of the people that have caused the problems. That’s a pretty straightforward thing, as well. Why would we keep CEOs and CFOs and other senior officers, that caused the problems? That’s facially nuts. That’s our current system.

So stop that current system. We’re hiding the losses, instead of trying to find out the real losses. Stop that, because you need good information to make good decisions, right? Follow what works instead of what’s failed. Start appointing people who have records of success, instead of records of failure. That would be another nice place to start. There are lots of things we can do. Even today, as late as it is. Even though they’ve had a terrible start to the administration. They could change, and they could change within weeks. And by the way, the folks who are the better regulators, they paid their taxes. So, you can get them through the vetting process a lot quicker.

BILL MOYERS: William Black, thank you very much for being with me on the Journal.

WILLIAM K. BLACK: Thank you so much.

Very noticeable that many established and well-known individual websites like Seeking Alpha, Twitter, Facebook, Market Oracle(UK), Live Journal, Huffington Post, Wall Street Pit etc. - all sites that tend not to toe the US political or media line with their individual  views and reporting  — have now been under significant denial-of-service attacks beginning about two months ago. Apparently, certain powerful people out there in America’s cyber-land are not enjoying the “alternative news” escaping into the blogosphere and are now actively involved in preventing it. In a message on their home page today, Seeking Alpha apologizes for the slowness of their site’s response and describes the problems caused by these denial-of-service attacks.

Definition of Denial-of-Service Attack (DoS Attack)

This is an attempt to make a computer resource unavailable to its intended users. Although the means to carry out, motives for, and targets of a DoS attack may vary, it generally consists of the concerted efforts of a person or people to prevent an Internet site or service from functioning efficiently or at all, temporarily or indefinitely. Perpetrators of DoS attacks typically target sites or services hosted on high-profile web servers such as banks, credit card payment gateways, and even root nameservers.

One common method of attack involves saturating the target (victim) machine with external communications requests, such that it cannot respond to legitimate traffic, or responds so slowly as to be rendered effectively unavailable. In general terms, DoS attacks are implemented by either forcing the targeted computer(s) to reset, or consuming its resources so that it can no longer provide its intended service or obstructing the communication media between the intended users and the victim so that they can no longer communicate adequately.

Interesting  that the National CyberSecurity Division(NCD) of Homeland Security has just hired over 1000 cyber experts recently in response to cyber-attacks on federal security systems from the internet.

So, I guess these new National CyberSecurity Division(NCD) professionals are, perhaps, just getting some trivial practice in on some government-stroppy US websites. Having been on the respectable side  of the software and internet industry for over 20 years now,  I personally know the terrible damage that these hackers can cause. If the NCD(or any other govt agency) are involved in these local denial-of-service attacks, then the elite National CyberSecurity Division better tread very carefully indeed here. There must be tens of thousands of competent, knowledgeable and very individual hackers out there — not only in America, but all round the world — who might get really pissed off with their activities and if the NCD make all the wrong moves — whether from law or not — these hackers could not care less, and will probably go on the attack just for the fun of it — and their cyber attacks will be well-organized, concerted and nuclear — the worst kind of attack. And in the blogosphere, if you know what you’re doing, it is about the most level martial playing-field in existence today.

Who knows — perhaps Hypocrisy.com will also  qualify for this denial-of-service censorship privilege soon…

Goody.

Article from Jim Sinclair’s Website

You can take your waves, percentages, algorithms, quants and quarks and throw them directly into the basket. The time for lines and squiggles are behind us. The common shares of the US dollar are and have been in a long term downtrend. That downtrend is 81 days from implosion. The selling of the US dollar and US dollar instruments is increasing in international markets, making it ever more difficult to manipulate the popular US dollar index, the USDX.

The price of gold is all in the dollar, times 100.

The manipulators have built a fundamental spring into gold by their capping activities.

COT [The Carry Trade Dollar Manipulations] has cooked its own goose.

Where the price of gold is concerned, there is no other focus of interest as all points of interest have but one common denominator.

That entity is the US dollar.

The Fundamental illustration below is dollar flow momentum.

China holds in its hands the future of the category, “Foreign Purchasers of US bonds.”

China wishes the annihilation of the Fed policy of “Quantitative Easing.”

The Fed wishes to accommodate China.

The US Treasury is absolutely opposed to any such consideration as it would cement the present Administration into a one term wonder.

The US Treasury must win this battle because the boss of this opposition has the power to appoint the new Chairman of the Fed, either Summers or Geithner.

Political control of the US Fed and therefore of monetary policy is in the cards.

China as spokesman for the BRICs has publicly stated their desire for the institutions of a Super Sovereign Currency. This is not an intended as an immediate substitute for the dollar as a reserve currency but rather an alternative in new commitments.

Only the misinformed assume the desire for an SSCI [The Senate Selext Committee on Intelligence] is a desire for a total exchange of dollar reserves.

The desire of the BRICs and in truth all other major trading nations is for dollar diversification in order to break away from the dollar dictating their futures. It means a significant decrease in purchases of US dollar denominated instruments.

Selling is not required for substantial depreciation in a major currency.

Momentum collapse in buying is all that is required for a severe depreciation in any major currency.

The USA in all probability will not be able politically to deliver support for the SSCI, however political control of monetary policy is CERTAIN as the Fed cannot win this contest against the Administration in the form of the US Treasury.

Bernanke becomes a team player or a team player will replace him.

The later is becoming a probability as it is hard to trust a prior adversary.

The depreciating dollar was a tool of Roosevelt’s failed anti-deflation program that like monetary stimulation is believed to have been abandoned too soon in the 30s by Administration intellectuals. Because of this, the US dollar is out of the picture for serious Administration consideration other than as a sales issue on US treasuries.

It is my understanding that the BRIC countries, not China alone, have given the US until early November to deliver.

As a result of the above I see 81 days left for the US dollar.

The gold price has but one criteria and that is the US dollar. Armstrong and Alf are correct on the levels awaiting the gold price.

I know $1224 and $1650 are certain

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[See Charts Below -- Best viewed in browser  full-screen mode]

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Well it sure looks like ObamaCare has flunked the political test big-time. With the public option now virtually off the table and well into the vapours by now, with Obama recently shrugging his shoulders and ever-so-casually belittling and  dismissing this crucial option as “just a sliver of the Health Care Bill”, thereby implying that this public health option was unimportant — you might as well boot ObamaCare into trash for all the use it will be now. Put simply, the Big Pharma lobbyists  have  successfully wiped out the competition — therefore  drug costs will continue to rise unhindered, the field is clear for them now and  their faithful  shareholders must truly be ecstatic and positively dribbling  in anticipation at  the future profits due from this remarkable outcome. They  have already won and “affordable Health Care” has become a verbal, fast-fading mirage as well as a damn poor joke. So, another outright policy failure by The Administration and no doubt Obama will easily absolve himself, carefully manouevering  and untouched by this result,  safe enough to blame Congress or the Senate here in his stern, silver-tongued and well-rehearsed Absolution.

But what of Wall Street Reform, will Obama enthrall us all again with yet another fiasco?  Ah well, if this is the case, then at least we can safely state that President Obama has been remarkably consistent with his feckless and unsuccessful policy outcomes…

Article by Robert Reich|Aug 14, 2009, 2:08 PM|Author’s Website

Citigroup (NYSE:C)– the giant Wall Street bank still on life-support courtesy of $45 billion from American taxpayers — wants to pay its twenty-five top executives an average of $10 million each this year, and award its best trader $100 million. Whaaat?

Second only to healthcare reform as a test of Obama’s toughness and resolve is reform of Wall Street. And like the healthcare industry, Wall Street has platoons of lobbyists and an almost unlimited war chest to protect its interests and prevent change. So what can we learn by what’s going on now, regarding pay for the top brass at big “too big to fail” banks?

After the bonus plan for AIG (NYSE:AIG) executives blew up last year, a law enacted last February requires that any “too big to fail” institution that’s received bailouts get Treasury’s approval on pay for their top earners. Companies are supposed to file their pay proposals no later than today. So far, most are seeking around $7 million each for their top twenty-five.

As you can expect, Citi and the rest argue that $7 to $10 billion is necessary in order to keep and attract “talent.”

Tragically, Treasury has already given in on this one. In judging whether a proposed pay package is appropriate, Treasury has decided to be guided by “comparable” pay packages in the industry. This means Ken Feinberg, appointed as special master to decide on a case-by-case basis, will be the flak-catcher. He’ll take the heat when he approves pay packages that, while perhaps not as ridiculously exhorbitant as the ones the banks seek, are still bonkers because they’re roughly “comparable” to the wild pay on the rest of the Street — thereby protecting Geithner and Geithner’s boss from the public’s outrage about bailing out these bankers and then having them earn princely sums at a time when most peoples’ jobs are at risk and their earnings are shrinking.

“Comparable” pay is a ridiculous standard to begin with, and the argument that $10 million, or even $7 million, is necessary to keep talent is absurd on its fact. I needn’t remind you that over the last several years Wall Street has exhibited a truly astonishing lack of talent. So why do any of Wall Street’s big banks have the audacity to offer this sort of pay? Because the Street is back to the same, relentlessly untalented tactics that made it lots of money before the meltdown — which also forced taxpayers to bail it out, caused the world economy to melt down, and tens of millions of people to lose big chunks of their life savings. Goldman Sach’s (NYSE:GS) chief financial executive asserted recently that its business model hadn’t changed one bit from what it was before the meltdown. Goldman is making big money again, but its business model got it into such deep trouble it needed a multi-billion dollar taxpayer bailout as well as a bailout of AIG, which owed it money. Without these bailouts, there’d be no “talent” because there’d be no Goldman, no Citi, no Street.

Even if you believe Wall Street needs “talent,” I suspect that firms such as Citi can get all the talent they need for far less than an average of $10 million each. Maybe even $1 million? The whole system of “comparable” pay is propped up by a zero-sum self-perpetuating competition in which the price of so-called “talent” is determined by how much every other bank is willing to pay for “talent.” If every bank decided to pay $1 million, that would be the “comparable” price of talent on the Street. I mean, it’s not as if this economy has so many other $1 million-a-year positions begging for Wall Street executives and traders.

There’s a more basic issue here. The fact that these big banks have been judged “too big to fail” means their top executives and traders know they can take even bigger risks now, because we taxpayers will bail them out. So inevitably part of their firm’s earnings, based on such risk-taking, now come as a result of this public insurance policy. When risks pay off, as many are doing now that the stock market is showing signs of life, they reap large rewards. When the risks turn really bad, you and I and other taxpayers will pick up the pieces.

The insurance these “too big to fail” banks are receiving makes them more like public utilities than private firms. As such, not only is it entirely appropriate for government to review their pay but also to make sure pay is kept within strict bounds — not $100 million, not $10 million, not $7 million, but far, far less. As long as you and I are cushioning them, their top brass should be earning just about what the top brass of any public utility earns (which, when I last looked, ranged from $100,000 to $600,000).

The big banks have a choice, of course. They could opt out of the “too big to fail” system. They could break themselves apart (or invite antitrust agencies to do the breaking for them) so they were no longer too big to fail and won’t be bailed out the next time they make hugely stupid mistakes. Then they could award their executives and traders as much money as they wanted and as the market would bear — because then they’d be part of the free market instead of wards of the state.

Will this happen? Don’t bet on it. Note how easily Treasury caved in on the “comparable” pay standard. In coming months, other financial regulators will decide appropriate pay guidelines for the institutions they supervise. Two weeks ago, the House passed legislation giving regulators even greater authority over compensation packages. Given what’s happened to date, there’s no reason to suppose Wall Street pay will be reined in at all.

In two surprising, simultaneous articles within the New York Times, Nuriel Roubini praises Bernanke for his crisis policies and his ability to think outside the box(see article  The Great Preventer), while Anna Schwartz, the famous co-author with Milton Friedman of “A Monetary History of the United States”, berates and criticizes Bernanke for stepping outside his monetary  policy remit and for interferring so radically with the free markets — into the dangerous waters of government  fiscal policy and protectionism.  As well, Schwartz attacks Bernanke’s stance on apparently adhoc FED policies whose lack of explanation or transparency and secrecy have perhaps caused as many problems as they have solved.

First, Roubini’s praise:

Last week Ben Bernanke appeared before Congress, setting off a discussion over whether the president should reappoint him as chairman of the Federal Reserve when his term ends next January. Mr. Bernanke deserves to be reappointed. Both the conventional and unconventional decisions made by this scholar of the Great Depression prevented the Great Recession of 2008-2009 from turning into the Great Depression 2.0.

Mr. Bernanke understands that in the Great Depression, the collapse of the money supply and the lack of monetary stimulus during contractions worsened the country’s economic free fall. This lesson has paid off. Mr. Bernanke’s decision to keep interest rates low and encourage lending has, for now, averted the L-shaped near depression that seemed highly likely after the financial collapse last fall.

Here, Roubini is mindful that Bernanke has perhaps only staved off the coming Depression by manipulating monetary policy. It is also clear from his article that,  by supporting Bernanke’s performance,  Roubini agrees with the propping up of sick or insolvent banking institutions, and fully supports a reversion of the status quo to a pre-crisis financial structure and behaviour.

But, having praised Bernanke, Roubini admits many caveats:

He and the Fed made three major mistakes when the subprime mortgage crisis began. First, he kept arguing that the housing recession would bottom out soon (it has not bottomed out even three years later). Second, he argued that the subprime problem was a contained problem when in reality it was a symptom of the biggest leverage and credit bubble in American history. Third, he argued that the collapse in the housing market would not lead to a recession, even though about one-third of jobs created in the latest economic recovery were directly or indirectly related to housing. Mr. Bernanke’s analysis was mistaken in several other important ways. He argued that monetary policy should not be used to control asset bubbles. He attributed the large United States current account deficits to a savings glut in China and emerging markets, understating the role that excessive fiscal deficits and debt accumulation by American households and the financial system played.

Roubini, ends his piece by asking questions:

Some of these moves have raised important questions: Did the Fed help bail out institutions that should have been allowed to fail? Did it cause moral hazard as reckless lenders and investors were effectively bailed out? How and when will the Fed mop up the excess liquidity that its actions have created? Will these actions eventually cause inflation and a sharp fall of the value of the dollar? Has the Fed lost its independence as it has accommodated the fiscal needs of the government by bailing out banks and printing money to cover large fiscal deficits?

Some of these careful questions by Roubini are openly and soundly criticised by Anna Schwartz. In her NYT article, Man Without a Plan, she makes several points:

As Federal Reserve chairman, Ben Bernanke has committed serious sins of commission and omission — and for those many sins, he does not deserve reappointment.

Let me begin with the former. It is standard practice for a central bank like the Federal Reserve to ease monetary policy to combat a recession, and then to tighten it as recovery gets under way. Mr. Bernanke so far has only had to do the first half, and has conducted a policy of extreme ease. The Fed’s Open Market Committee cut the federal funds rate in October to 1 percent from 1.5 percent, and then in December to a range of zero percent to 0.25 percent.

What drove down the funds rate was the Federal Reserve’s decision to increase its depository bank reserves. Bank reserves have been rising since Sept. 17, as the Fed purchased securities and financed loans. When the Fed committee cut the rate to zero, it was merely ratifying the de facto rate.

Mr. Bernanke seems to know only two amounts: zero and trillions. Before 2008 there were only moderate increases in the Federal Reserve’s aggregate balance sheet numbers, but since then the balance sheet has exploded by trillions of dollars. The increase was spurred by the Fed’s loans to troubled institutions and purchases of securities.

Unlike Roubini, Schwartz does not commend Bernanke for thinking outside the box, heavily criticizing his extreme and dangerous use of QE with low interest rates:

Why is easy monetary policy such a sin? Because in such an environment, loans are cheap and borrowers can finance every project that they dream up. This results in excesses, and also increases the severity of the recession that inevitably follows when the bubble bursts

Anna Schwartz then moves to criticize Bernanke and Greenspan for what they did not do prior to this financial crisis, referring to the FED’s absent  market warnings and peculiar bailout favoritism during the crisis:

Partly as a result of the Fed’s silence, investors who loaded up their balance sheets with these securities were ignorant of the great risks of trying to sell assets that are difficult to price. Other new instruments, like derivatives, were not risk-free, although the market became enamored of them.

The Fed is the manager of markets. There is thus every reason to expect that it would see the problems that these new instruments were likely to create for normal transactions, and speak up about them.

The Fed delivered plenty of rhetoric about the importance of transparency, yet failed to articulate its own goals. The market was thus bewildered when the Fed rescued certain firms and not others. Mr. Bernanke should have explained the principles behind these decisions. The market could not understand why the Fed rescued Bear Stearns and then permitted Lehman Brothers to die.

In the end Anna Schwartz unequivocally recommends that Ben Bernanke not be re-appointed as FED chairman in 2010:

I am certain that there are economists whose reputations for outstanding academic work in monetary policy are every bit as distinguished as Mr. Bernanke’s, and who have good judgment and experience within the Federal Reserve System. President Obama should choose one of them.